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by Brendan O’Leary  
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. government.  
Introduction 
The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A New Approach[1] is poorly researched, fails 
to appreciate the political consequences of the changes which have happened in Iraq since 2003, 
treats Iraq’s constitution of 2005 with contempt, and yearns, for no good reasons, for a return to a 
highly centralized Iraq. Before establishing these propositions it is necessary to answer a prior 
question, namely, “Should time be invested in flogging a dead horse?” 
After all, it is widely said that The ISG Report is politically extinct. One of the President’s reported 
responses suggested he wanted it flushed away.[2] The prospects of the Group’s major 
recommendations having purchase within Iraq are close to zero because it has been rejected in 
scorching language by the leaders of Kurdistan, and by significant Shi‘a Arab leaders. The ISG 
Report, however, is not definitively dead. It is instead in a state of suspended occultation, like the 
Twelfth Imam. It will be resurrected, regularly, during the U.S. presidential primary campaigns. 
Major Democratic and Republican party candidates, who all need an Iraq policy, have already 
begun to cling to The ISG Report for fear of something worse. It enables presidential candidates 
to have plenty of distance from the current Administration without the need for a more thoughtful 
policy. Worse, The ISG Report is widely seen as the expression of judicious bi-partisan wisdom. 
For that reason alone American, European and Iraqi policy-makers need to be clear about The 
ISG Report’s defects. The one merit of the future resurrection of The ISG Report is that may 
enable real debate to commence. The responsible debate on Iraq, for Americans, should not be 
between exponents of the The ISG Report, or immediate exit. Instead it should be between 
exponents of the federalization program in the constitution, and exponents of a controlled break-
up. This is no easy choice. The inter-Arab civil war will accompany either option. 
What’s in a Name?  
The Iraq Study Group was not Iraqi , but American, written in American for Americans. There was 
no official Arabic or Kurdish translation. The two official languages of Iraq were equally 
“disrespected.” In compiling its findings the Group visited Baghdad, or rather “the Green Zone,”[3] 
but not Iraq’s only fully functioning and constitutionally authorized entity, namely the Kurdistan 
Region, and its official bodies, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the elected 
Kurdistan National Assembly. This omission may explain why the KRG is not displayed on The 
ISG Report’s map of Iraq’s administrative divisions (see page 101). Some of America’s wisest 
approved what may seem a careless act of cartographic ignorance. But the KRG’s erasure from 
the map is better regarded as malice aforethought: it is in keeping with the temper of The ISG 
Report. 
The Iraq Study Group did not study . No one relied on Vernon Jordan’s grasp of Kurmanji or 
Sorani dialects of Kurdish, or Lawrence Eagleburger’s appraisal of the different conceptions of 
the appropriate political role of Muslim jurists. No fresh social scientific research was 
commissioned to underpin this clearly written book, designed for the consumption of the educated 
public. There are no references to rigorous ‘meta-research’, i.e., evaluations of all research done 
on and in Iraq, policy sector by sector, since 2003. As in the best organized of conspiracies “if 
that were done, it was done quietly.”  
The ISG Report was, lastly, not the work of a group . Two Washington think-tanks and one Texas 
university are implicated in its contents. A range of experts—many of whom advised or worked in 
the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003-4—are listed as having talked or deliberated in ways 
that helped the co-chairs and the group. It would be cruel, but not wholly false, to say that those 
who had learned nothing (i.e., members of the expert working groups) reported to those who 
know nothing (i.e., the members of the group). Soundings, as the English say, were taken with a 
serving British prime minister, two Presidents, past and presently distinguished secretaries of 
state and generals, and a range of other personages of high rank and title. Washington’s elected 
elite, a sub-section of its academy, and some celebrity journalists had opportunities to 
‘participate’—as a patient participates with his dentist. All agree, however, that The ISG Report, 
allegedly a collective effort, and undoubtedly collectively agreed, is unmistakably ‘authored’ by 
James Baker III. The text bears all the characteristics of his techniques, and he fronted its 
preparations and its launch. 
What is its Nature?  
The ISG Report suggests that its contents are a perfectly integrated whole; they must be taken as 
an entire package; their recommendations must not be cherry-picked. But even if all its 
recommendations were followed, which would be difficult because they are contradictory,[4] it 
would not tidy up America’s policy predicament in Iraq. The ISG Report is not in the least realistic 
in several of its key prescriptions. Kurdistan’s leaders and public think it is highly unrealistic. 
Reflective Americans strategists will think so too, after they extract themselves from whatever 
pain or pleasure they may derive from reading The ISG Report’s searing indictments of existing 
U.S. policy. The ISG Report’s historical importance is clear. It has been a mechanism through 
which the moderate and bi-partisan U.S. foreign policy establishment united to criticize the Bush 
II Administration’s Iraq policies (plural, since no one thinks there has been just one, though some 
doubt there ever was any policy as such). The ISG Report commendably seeks to restore good 
order in American policy-making: in analysis and formulation, in civilian-military relations, and in 
the conduct of coherent diplomacy. That does not mean it is either realistic or right. 
Who is Being Unreal?  
We are immediately told “There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq” (see page 1). 
Who believes they possess such a formula? The President? The text bristles with undeclared 
contempt for neo-conservative unilateral adventurism. But, such neo-conservatives, now a 
beleaguered platoon, according to some, though still in control, according to others, are not the 
only targets. Also obliquely attacked are internationalist liberals who believe in principled 
humanitarian intervention against genocidal dictators, and ‘democracy promotion’ enthusiasts. 
Sotto voce, other are being attacked, namely the Iraqis who believed, and still believe, that Iraq 
might become a federal and pluralist democracy. Many of these Iraqis have a major grudge 
against James Baker III. After all, he decisively argued that Saddam should be left in power in 
1991 after the first President Bush had encouraged the Kurds and Shi‘a Arabs to rebel. Baker 
now reportedly says that no one asks him any longer why he did that.[5] If so, that is proof of 
consistency. Baker does not listen to representative Kurds and Shi‘a Arabs, or follow their 
counsel, because they are disposable instruments in the realistic appraisal of America’s interests. 
The ISG Report suggests, by implication that President George W Bush should have listened to 
Baker, in the way that his father did. This last sentence now has widespread consent within 
informed American opinion, which has mostly turned strongly against America’s intervention in 
Iraq. But Baker was wrong in 1991. Moreover he is wrong now, and it must be hoped that his 
errors do not become the new orthodoxy of American foreign policy. 
The Baker’s Diagnosis 
James Baker III’s analysis of what is wrong in Iraq, unsurprisingly, gets the basics right. He is 
largely correct about the sources of violence. Its key driver has been a Sunni Arab insurgency, 
run by a network of networks, supplied primarily from within Iraq (perish the thought that Saudi 
quartermasters might matter). The insurgency aims at a Sunni restoration. The ISG Report does 
not quite say so, but that means the restoration to power of the formerly dominant minority. In 
these Sunni Arab insurgencies, Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, Baker rightly says, is a secondary 
player—and so is the ‘foreign fighter’, meaning Arab foreign fighter. The ISG Report gets right the 
character of sectarian violence, and the murderous responsibility of militias in both the Sunni Arab 
and Shi‘a Arab communities. But it lacks the frankness to describe the conflict as an Arab civil 
war. The stability of parts of the south of Iraq is recognized, as is that of the Kurdistan Region, 
though it is not called that, but inaccurately described as “the three provinces of the Kurdish 
north,” as if the Kurds owned the northern part of the compass, and as if the KRG neatly 
encapsulates three of Saddam’s governance units. 
Baker’s thumbnail sketch of the perspectives widely held within each of the three major groups, 
i.e., Sunni Arabs, Shi‘a Arabs and Kurds, is broadly correct, though it is egregiously insulting and 
misleading to treat the perspective of Kurds under “sectarian viewpoints.” Kurds are a nation, not 
a sect, and comprise Sunni and Shi‘a Muslims (including Alevis on some interpretations), 
Christians, Jews, Yezidis, agnostics and atheists. 
As to the “key issues” in Iraq, Baker’s diagnosis merits an “a g,” an alpha gamma, the grade 
historically given in British universities to those who are extraordinarily bright but nevertheless 
make extremely foolish judgments. Three “key issues” are identified: federalism, Kirkuk, and 
governance. On the first, The ISG Report is against the federalism of Iraq’s constitution, and 
claims, remarkably, that there is no economically feasible “Sunni region.” That either suggests 
that any future such region has no oil—which is not true[6]—or that any such place is necessarily 
dependent on hand-outs from the rest of Iraq, which is both unproven and implausible. On the 
second, it says that Kirkuk is a powder-keg, and that the referendum on its final status should be 
postponed. It does not say until when. “For ever” is implied. On the third, it identifies four separate 
matters: (i) biased government by Shi‘a, (ii) insecurity, (iii) rampant corruption, and (iv) the 
problems caused by the missing technocrats, lost in de-Ba'athification. No prizes for guessing 
what The ISG Report favors, namely unbiased government, security, clean government and 
bringing back Ba'athist technocrats—who, no doubt, know a lot about unbiased, secure and clean 
government. 
There is, revealingly, no discussion of Islam or Islamist politics, though there is this remarkable 
gem, “The Saudis could use their Islamic credentials to help reconcile differences between Iraqi 
factions” (see page 48). These credentials are not specified, nor are the factions. For those who 
do not yet know, the House of Saud is the political and military wing of the Wahhabi sect. One of 
the first foreign policy excursions of that sect, in 1802, was an organized raid and looting of 
Karbala—the site of the martyrdom and burial of the Shi‘a Imam Husayn. The House of Saud 
presently partially enforces Wahhabist doctrine, which deems most Sunnis and all Shi‘a guilty of 
ignorance, shirk (attribution of partners to God), and innovation.[7] Wahhabism treats the Shi‘a as 
apostates—the penalty for which is famously draconian. Wahhabi doctrine is hostile to the 
Naqshbandi Sufi tradition once vigorous in rural Kurdistan. It has no love of the Shafi‘ite legal 
school prevalent among Sunni Kurds. It has low opinions of the Hanafite school that prevails 
among non-Kurds in the vicinity. It even rejects the Hanbali school from which its founder 
originated. In fact, it rejects all four Sunni schools of fiqh.[8] What exactly did Mr. Baker have in 
mind regarding the conflict-resolution specialists among the Wahhabis? Quite why the Sunni 
Arabs of the Fertile Crescent—in their numerous rivalries—might accede to Saudi good offices is 
unknown—or undeclared. The Islamic credentials of the House of Saud might indeed be 
productive in reconciling differences among factions in Iraq. But perhaps only among particular 
fanatics, namely, Salifiyya, jihadists, and al-Qaeda. Even then it would not be a ‘slam dunk’, as 
the heads of U.S. intelligence agencies are wont to say of allegedly high probability outcomes. 
We must suspect that is not what Mr. Baker had in mind.[9] 
The Baker’s Medicine 
Mr. Baker usefully distinguishes his external and internal prescriptions. Seeking an international 
consensus for stability in Iraq and in the region he suggests that Iraq’s neighbors and other 
players should form a ‘support group’. While what we may call the Fertile Crescent Violence 
Anonymous Group (FCVAG) is being formed, he commends that the United States should 
“engage” Syria and Iran, and directly address the ‘Arab-Israeli’ conflict—not, be it noted, the 
‘Palestinian-Israeli’ antagonism. Commending a diplomatic and international multi-lateral 
engagement in the entire region is a return to previous wisdom—in which the snows of yesteryear 
appear to have survived the sun much better. Mr. Baker does not explain his commitment to what 
has been called “the Jerusalem syndrome,”[10] the idea that all roads to peace, stability and 
reasonably well-ordered states in the Middle East must go through Jerusalem, i.e., resolving the 
Israeli- Palestinian question. Nor does he explain, overtly, what the United States can offer Syria, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, and why they should all co-operate over the future of Iraq, when 
they have not done so, so far, on their own. The U.S. President has certainly not immediately 
cherry-picked these proposals. Instead of a diplomatic opening to Syria and Iran the President 
increased oral threats, closed Iraq’s border with Iran, and allowed his officials to accuse Iran of 
directly supplying militias in Iraq. The Bush Administration has, however, more recently shown 
willingness to follow Iraqi initiatives to engage their neighbors in conference. Had it not done so 
that would have been a denial of Iraq’s sovereignty. 
Internally, Baker commends that any increase in U.S. troops should be focused on having them 
“imbedded in and supporting” Iraqi Army units. The United States’ military mission should move to 
support rather than combat. The Army—and Marine—presence should be reduced and focused 
on al-Qaeda. The President has also not cherry picked these proposals. Instead we are in the 
middle of a “surge,” in which debate in Washington has focused on whether it is sufficiently 
surgical, and whether it should be supported or rejected in a non-binding show of resolution. 
To obtain national reconciliation, security and governance Baker commended that ‘milestones’ be 
set for Iraq’s sovereign government. This idea has proven popular with both of Washington’s two 
political parties. 
So, while Mr. Baker believes in tough love for the democratically elected government of Iraq, he 
believes in appeasement for its authoritarian neighbors—some of whom he credits with conflict-
resolution skills. Such thinking is alleged to show the sophisticated mark of the realist, as 
opposed to that of a merely pragmatic lawyer. Such thinking is much less easily understood by 
mere idealists, who do not understand that foreign policy is not missionary work. Other detailed 
commendations—on criminal justice, the oil sector, reconstruction, the making of the U.S. budget, 
and the organization of U.S. intelligence follow, and that is it. What follows is confined to the 
constitutional high politics of The ISG Report. 
Did Mr. Baker Do His Homework? 
Did Mr. Baker review other options? Yes, on pages 37-9 of The ISG Report, i.e., in about the 
same number of words as each of the attached resumes of the Study Group’s members. These 
were (1) Precipitate withdrawal; (2) Staying the course; (3) More troops for Iraq, and (4) 
Devolution to 3 regions. The ISG Report says “No” to all of these options, though it is flexible on 
(3), enabling some to claim there is no fatwa in Baker-Hamilton against “the Surge.” The ISG 
Report hints that it is the word ‘precipitate’ which most offends sensibilities over option (1). Quod 
erat demonstrandum. 
What was glaringly not assessed, and consequently drew controlled expressions of 
condemnation from the Presidents of the Kurdistan Region and of Iraq, was option (5), namely 
supporting the implementation of Iraq’s constitution. This option is not the same as option (2), and 
it is not compatible with option (4), though many, wrongly, think otherwise—because the 
constitution does not permit Baghdad to join any region, though it is entitled to become a region 
of its own. 
Why this studied neglect? The answer is that The ISG Report is a full-frontal assault on Iraq’s 
constitution of 2005. It commends a course of action that would push the U.S. government 
completely to unravel Iraq’s constitution, which was endorsed by four of five of Iraq’s voters, a 
higher level of endorsement than that enjoyed by any attempts to change the constitution of 
Canada. While suggesting no changes in the constitutions of any of Iraq’s neighbors (let alone 
regime changes), The ISG Report treats the new democratic constitution of the United States’ 
Iraqi ally with contempt. 
The ISG Report is a recipe for a constitutional coup d’état, but without local coup-leaders, for now. 
The prescription is terse, “The USG should support as much possible central control by 
governmental authorities in Baghdad, particularly on the question of oil revenues” (see page 39). 
It carefully does not say “within the limits of the constitution,” or “the rule of law”; it just says as 
“much possible central control.” “Go figure.” 
Remarkably, The ISG Report claims that it offers a “new approach.” In fact it is no different from 
that promoted by L. Paul Bremer III before the making of the Transitional Administrative Law of 
2004. It is an interesting anthropological fact that Americans with III after their names often have 
the same ideas. Perhaps they come from the same sect? 
In Defense of the Constitution of 2005  
Mr. Baker seems to have forgotten obvious facts, even though he has doubtless been told them 
many times.  
One: No successful negotiations could have materialized in 2005 from the comprehensive 
“inclusion” of Sunni Arabs in the making of Iraq’s constitution. The Sunni Arabs who were present 
in the Iraqi Assembly had demands that were completely unacceptable to their constitutional 
partners, the elected representatives of at least four fifths of Iraq’s population. The Sunni Arab 
political leaders who were absent had either boycotted the elections to the constitutional 
convention, or were supporting armed violence against the transitional government and its civilian 
supporters, or they were intimidated from indicating their willingness to compromise. 
Any honest and informed observer will report that many Sunni Arabs, as a formerly dominant 
minority, remain strongly inclined to see Kurds and Shi’a as “special interests,” and as racial and 
religious inferiors respectively. They usually regard their own interests as identical with “Iraq’s.” 
The so-called “nation-state” of Iraq was after all built around them, so it is not surprising that 
many of them feel this way. They behave, in short, as if they are the “Staatsvolk,” the people who 
own the state. Apart from these dispositions, which unify them, Sunni Arabs are deeply internally 
divided—between Ba'athists, Islamists of every Sunni stripe, and traditional and neo-traditional 
tribes. They differ radically over means and goals—other than their adamant rejection of the new 
order. Not much has changed since the summer of 2005, except that Sunni Arabs are now 
suffering much more than in 2003-5. That is because of the actions of their own insurgents, who 
have unleashed the hell of vigorous counter-cleansing against their own community. The U.S.-led 
‘surge’, if successful, will prevent the Shi‘a Arab militias from expelling Sunni Arabs from Baghdad. 
If successful it can be expected to generate astonishing levels of ingratitude all around. 
Two: It is best if constitution-making (or renewal) and peace processes can go together, but 
sometimes it is not possible to have all good things concurrently. If no appeasement strategy that 
will pacify Sunni Arabs is acceptable to the leaders of the Kurds and Shi ‘a Arabs—even with their 
arms squeezed behind their backs—why does it make sense to look for one? What made Mr. 
Baker think there is a viable appeasement strategy? The limits of any such strategy are obvious. 
No strategy for appeasing Sunni Arabs is worth considering if it leads to an equal and opposite 
negative reaction in Kurdistan or among the Shi ‘a Arabs. Such a reaction has already occurred in 
response to Mr. Baker’s report, which is not U.S. policy, though it is feared as a guide to future 
policy. Mr. Baker’s implicit calculation must be that both Kurds and Shi‘a Arabs can be squeezed 
to address Sunni Arab interests and demands. If that hypothesis gets tested only regrettable 
consequences will follow. 
Three: Though it is true that a fully successful peace process in Iraq requires some significant 
Sunni Arab compliance with the new dispensation, nevertheless much of Iraq functions without 
that compliance, and more can do so in future. Kurdistan is institutionalized, and can flourish. The 
South is emergent and can function, despite its internal conflicts among parties and their militias. 
The South, by Iraqi law, will be able to form a region or several regions in 2008. Baghdad and the 
“ungoverned” governorates (Anbar, Nineveh, Salahaddin, and parts of Diyala) are the major 
violent problem-sites, so it is sensible that military and policing policy should focus on them, but 
only if such policies are part of a plausible political and constitutional strategy, i.e., one that 
minimally encompasses the new power-holders, Kurds and Shi‘a Arabs. 
As long as the key representatives of Sunni Arabs reject federalism the representative leaders of 
other communities will believe that Sunni Arabs harbor ambitions to be restored as the 
“Staatsvolk.” When significant numbers of Sunni Arabs accept federalism, and consider that 
having their own self-governing region or regions, with a proportional stake in the federal 
government, is in their best interests, then we will know that the intra-Arab civil war is coming to 
an end. Mr. Baker’s response, by contrast, is to commend the gutting of federalism, and to reward 
the Sunni Arab insurgents. Mr. Baker’s proposes the restoration of centralism as the solution to 
Iraq’s intra-Arab civil war. It is a solution to current Sunni Arab grievances, but it is neither a 
reasonable nor a stable solution. Mr. Baker is willing to risk deeply upsetting 80 percent of Iraqis 
to appease some of the 20 percent. Why, one is entitled to ask, is this called “realism”? 
On Realist Nostalgia  
U.S. policy toward Iraq from 1980 to 1988 was to support a centralized Iraq (i.e., an Iraq in which 
the regionalist and democratic aspirations of Kurds and Shi‘a Arabs were repressed). A 
centralized Iraq was considered necessary to balance revolutionary Iran, which it was feared 
would over-run the Persian Gulf, and the oil-rich pockets of Shi‘a territory in the Arabian 
Peninsula. This thinking was complemented by the belief that America’s ally, Turkey, needed 
constant re-assurance on its Kurdish predicaments. The broader appeasement of Sunni Arab 
interests equally favored a centralized Iraq, whether in propping up local client-regimes (Jordan), 
or in assuring most-favored client-regimes (Saudi Arabia). The end of the Iran-Iraq War, 
Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, and Gulf War 1, briefly interrupted the policy preference for a 
centralized Iraq. The United States was embarrassed into supporting a no-fly zone and a de facto 
autonomous Kurdistan, but, under James Baker III, and his successors in the Clinton 
Administration, it was resolved not to support either the break-up of Iraq or regionalist movements 
among the Shi‘ a Arabs. That was deemed likely to aid the expansion of Iranian power. James 
Baker would like to return to this world. But that cannot happen unless the United States decides 
to restore a Sunni Arab dominated regime to power. 
The problem for the nostalgic Mr. Baker is that in the meantime Saddam Hussein’s regime has 
been overthrown. The still extant U.S. policy-preference for a centralized Iraq has been 
irreversibly shattered by the (unintended) consequences of (unintended) “democracy promotion.” 
No quick handover to a Sunni Arab general occurred after March 2003—as many feared, and 
some advocated. No interim government led by Ahmed Chalabi was immediately imposed—as 
some had hoped, and many had feared. Instead, there was an unplanned occupation, and under 
its auspices the Transitional Administrative Law was negotiated in the Spring of 2004, which 
framed the way Iraq’s new, democratic, federal and pluralist constitution was made and ratified in 
the summer and fall of 2005. 
In two Iraq-wide elections and one constitutional referendum the Kurdistan Alliance and the Shi‘a 
led United Iraqi Alliance copper-fastened the end of a centralized Iraq. Kurdistan now has 
remarkable and constitutionally ratified levels of autonomy. If the constitution of Iraq of 2005 
works Kurdistan will have greater legal autonomy within Iraq than has the average European 
state within the European Union. Kirkuk governorate may unify with Kurdistan this year after a 
referendum. The Constitution allows the nine Shi‘a majority governorates outside Baghdad to 
choose to have one big region, or several regions, with the same powers as Kurdistan. Baghdad 
has the right to become a region, but not to join any other region. The remaining four 
governorates, in which there are Sunni Arab majorities, may choose to allow the federal 
government to have stronger powers over them than it has in the rest of Iraq, or they may opt to 
create between one and four regions with the same powers as Kurdistan. In brief, the constitution 
allows each existing province outside of Kurdistan to determine how centralized it wishes Iraq to 
be for it. A remarkable constitutional compromise. 
There is not a word of recognition of any these constitutional facts in the Baker-Hamilton Report, 
which pines for a previous era, of a centralized Iraq. That Iraq gave the world wars with Kurdistan 
since the 1920s, culminating in genocidal massacres. That Iraq discriminated against its largest 
minority population (Kurds), and its largest majority community, Shi‘a Arabs, culminating in 
politicidal and genocidal repression of the Marsh Arabs. It was a centralized Iraq which joined the 
Nazis in World War II, and subsequently went to war with Israel, Iran, and Kuwait. The ISG 
Report nowhere observes that a centralized Iraq has not only been a present danger to its own 
peoples, but also to its neighbors. 
The ISG Report, in short, fails to appreciate the seismic shift in the internal politics of Iraq 
unintentionally wrought by the two Bush Administrations. It is not just Kurds who want radical 
regionalization. Leading lights in SCIRI want a big South. Kurdistan’s parties and SCIRI comprise 
the politically responsible and constructive forces in Iraq. Those who favor a centralized Iraq 
include Sunni Arabs, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, al-Sadr, the Bush II Administration, and the 
Baker-Hamilton authors and signatories. (There is, however, according to intelligence estimates 
in Kurdistan, and within SCIRI, no suggestion that these groups are working in concert). 
The Unrealistic Blueprint for the Betrayal of Iraq’s Constitution  
The textual contempt for Iraq’s constitution in the Baker-Hamilton Report is made plain in pivotal 
commendations. Its Recommendation 26 argues for UN involvement in a review of Iraq’s 
constitution. Ah, what a fresh outbreak of multilateral internationalism. Who could quarrel with that? 
But the UN has no role to play in any review process, according to Iraq’s constitution. What would 
the United States think if a report of retired politicians and judges in another country commended 
the UN’s role in a review of the U.S. Constitution, particularly its clauses on the Electoral College, 
states’ rights, and natural resources? 
The ISG Report’s Recommendation 27 extols the “reintegration of Ba’athists and Arab 
nationalists into national life.”[11] But the constitution carefully distinguishes Saddamite Ba‘athism 
from Ba‘athism, enabling exponents of the latter to have political existence. By “Arab nationalists” 
does the Baker-Hamilton Report mean Arabs? In which case, are they suggesting that Shi‘a 
Arabs are not Arab nationalists? Or, do they mean “pan-Arab” nationalists, who advocate that 
Iraq should merge with other Sunni-Arab majority states? And, what exactly do they mean by 
“national life”? After all, the constitution recognizes Iraq as a country of many nationalities. Again 
one might wonder how Americans would react to a team of retired politicians and former judges in 
a foreign country who commended that the United States re-habilitated in its national life the Klu 
Klux Klan, slave-holders, and supporters of British rule in the American colonies. 
The ISG Report’s Recommendation 28 is that oil revenues should accrue to “the central 
government” (sic!), i.e., it does not recognize that Iraq has a federal, not a central government. It 
declares “No formula that gives control over revenues from future fields to the regions or gives 
control of oil fields to the regions is compatible with national reconciliation.” But this is just not true. 
The existing constitutional formula guarantees that revenues from currently exploited fields must 
be allocated across Iraq on a per capita basis, and it does not prevent regions, which 
unambiguously control revenues from future fields, from agreeing to share revenues with the rest 
of Iraq. That is in fact what Kurdistan’s leaders have proposed, and is currently being drafted as 
law—which suggests that this formula is indeed possible. Not only does the Baker-Hamilton 
Report peddle a falsehood, it nowhere recognizes that the decentralization of ownership and 
control over natural resources is an excellent formula for weakening a despotic and corrupt 
political center.[12] We should charitably leave to one side the fact that the non-existence of 
centralized control and ownership of natural resources in the U.S. Constitution has apparently 
been compatible with public spiritedness among Texans in the land of the free and the home of 
the brave. 
Recommendation 30 asserts that the Kirkuk referendum be postponed, that international 
arbitration be sought, and that the question of Kirkuk be placed on the agenda of the Iraq Support 
Group (FCVAG). There is, deliberately, no provision in Iraq’s constitution that permits the 
postponement of the Kirkuk referendum. International assistance in encouraging mutual 
confidence among Kirkuk’s communities of Kurds, Turkomen, Arabs, Chaldeans and Assyrians is 
doubtless welcome, but binding arbitration would be by whom, and over what questions? And, 
exactly how will respect for Iraq’s territorial integrity be advanced by giving its neighbors (Syria, 
Turkey and Iran) a say in Iraq’s internal procedures for establishing its internal regional 
boundaries? Does Baker-Hamilton propose reciprocity, namely that the Foreign Minister of Iraq, 
who happens to be a Kurd, should have a stake in the internal structures of regional and local 
government in Iran, Turkey and Syria? The answer, regrettably, is “No.” Iran, Turkey and Syria, 
should be engaged diplomatically both by Iraq and by the United States, but one would have 
thought the right premises for such engagements would be respect for Iraq’s territorial integrity 
and its constitution, rather than offering the heads of Kurdistan’s political leaders and their 
people’s aspirations on a plate. The ISG Report never considers whether denying a referendum 
in Kirkuk may cause as many and potentially worse problems as implementing Iraq’s 
constitutional provisions. Nor whether encouraging Turkish irredentism or aggression—and 
legitimizing Turkey’s interests in the internal affairs of Iraq—may be as foolish as anything done 
by the Bush Administration. Sadly, and perhaps not deliberately, the Baker-Hamilton Report does 
not recognize the carefully crafted constitutional compromise on Kirkuk. Because Kirkuk’s oil-field 
is a currently exploited field it automatically follows that its revenues are constitutionally 
guaranteed for allocation across Iraq as a whole. The oil-benefits from Kirkuk, in short, are not for 
Kurdistan alone, wherever Kirkuk ends up. Kurdistan’s and SCIRI’s negotiators have already 
sensibly de-coupled controversies over Kirkuk’s oil field from the territorial status of the 
governorate and the city.[13] 
The correct U.S. and international policy on Kirkuk would be to ensure that the provisions on 
Kirkuk, and the other disputed territories, are implemented fairly, and to encourage the Kurdistan 
Government’s plans to have a power-sharing government in Kirkuk. The data from the two 
elections in 2005 and on the constitutional referendum in the same year show that a majority in 
Kirkuk governorate favor joining Kurdistan. Affirmative support on unification with the Kurdistan 
Region will only be enhanced by the constitutional provisions enabling the expelled to return to 
vote, and preventing Saddam’s settlers from having the right to vote on the territorial status of the 
governorate. It will also be enhanced by the fact that Kurdistan’s security is remarkably better 
than anywhere else in Iraq—which will encourage some Christians, Turkomen and Arabs to 
prefer the KRG to the status quo. A U.S. engagement with Turkey, which emphasized Turkey’s 
interests in a stable Kurdistan inside a stable federal Iraq, and which re-assured Turkey that the 
Turkomen would be treated fairly, is what is patently required. Instead Mr. Baker’s ISG Report 
has given fuel to every nostalgic Kemalist in Turkey’s military—a stunningly incompetent and de-
stabilizing stance. 
In any case, none of Baker’s recommendations for changes in Iraq’s constitution are feasible, 
except through a coup. Constitutional amendments in Iraq require, in effect, the support of those 
who made the constitution, and have to be enacted under the same procedures through which 
the constitution was made, namely “a majority of the voters” must agree, and the amendments 
“must not have two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates rejecting.” Moreover, as an 
established region, Kurdistan may veto any change affecting its powers (Art. 126 (4) blocks 
amendments to the constitution that weaken regions’ competences unless the region’s parliament 
and people consent). 
Authentic Realism, American Values, and Iraq’s Constitution 
Any realistic appraisal of contemporary Iraq, political and military, will report that it is divided into 
four parts: Kurdistan (including Kirkuk), Baghdad, the Sunni Arab triangle, and the South. 
Politically, Sunni Arab elites, jihadi religious fanatics and the Sadrists cling zealously to the vision 
of a centralized Iraq. It follows that supporting a pluralist and radically de-centralized federation 
has a good chance of weakening both the Ba'athists and the Sadrists. From the perspective of 
American interests and values it is the ‘reasonables’ who want a pluralist and de-centralized 
federation, and they have the constitutional warrant to proceed. This approach is not to commend 
the wholesale exclusion of Sunni Arab interests (which would merely mirror Mr. Baker’s exclusion 
of those of the Shi‘a Arabs and Kurdistan’s). Under the constitution Sunni Arabs, provided they 
take advantage of its provisions, have the right to self-government in any region they organize, 
including control over local security. They have the right to a per capita share of oil revenues from 
Iraq’s current fields; and they have decent prospects of further finds of oil and natural gas in their 
localities. The constitution recognizes Iraq’s membership of Arab League; and, rightly interpreted, 
imposes no rival version of Islam on their territories. Through proportional representation their 
parties are entitled to fair representation in federal institutions. Other minorities elsewhere in the 
world die—and kill—for such arrangements. The point is that Sunni Arabs are not maltreated by 
the constitution of 2005, and Baker’s report has therefore fed the numerous tissues of 
misrepresentation of these matters. The Baker-Hamilton Report has encouraged the “one more 
surge” mentality among Sunni Arabs. In so doing, far from being realistic, it has re-kindled 
magical thinking. Whereas Baker-Hamilton offers a three-way civil war, throwing Kurdish fat on to 
the fire, with invitations issued to the neighbors to enjoy the feast and to do the washing up, Iraq’s 
constitution offers both the prospects of a widely agreed Iraq through full-scale regionalization, 
and the prospect of a controlled and honorable exit for the United States and its remaining allies. 
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